

Transformation and divergence of the views on the problem of freedom in the ancient philosophy

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If we look at the instance of the philosophy of antiquity, we can observe the first sources of the problem of freedom. The plurality of views can even be noticed in that single period. As we go along learning the views of this epoch on the problem of freedom, we can observe the peculiarities of the transformation of the notion of freedom in that period, as well as its divergence.

If we assume that in the Classical society slavery is viewed as something natural and present, then we must conclude that the problem of freedom had nothing to do with the state of slaves in that society; the rights and freedoms only belonged to the ones with citizenship. It must specifically be stated that, citizens also bore all the responsibility of the events in the society. As we mentioned above, the notions of freedom and rights first determined and stated out in legal circles. If, in political point of view, the freedom is described and perceived as something of an algorithm of fixed actions directed at the establishment of the order and resolving social problems, then, from the legal point of view, the individual has no formal and fixed rights. There we can observe the pre-eminence of public and state interests.

It is important to note, that the notion of freedom, ideas about its correlation of the citizens' rights and duties are formed in the sphere of politics. Only Socrates was one of the first to note the unity of morality and politics, collectivity and individuality in freedom, and argued that the notion of freedom was related with creativity and choice. In Socrates' view, it is impossible to understand freedom without moral choice and disobedience to the moral codes. Therefore, man has perception which is also an illustrator of their moral views, and with the help of which man can make a difference between good and evil. In the face of a choice, man becomes an active creature, therefore, in a sense, the alternatives, which opened lies before him can truly be called potential, possible alternatives. In addition, the basis of the choice the man makes is comprised also of responsibility and moral judgment: "The ones who made wrong choice between the good and evil are the ones who did not fully perceived their responsibilities and thus made mistakes" [2].

As Socrates draws his attention to the moral side of social and individual problems, he related the freedom not only with choice, but also virtue, good, and morality. In Socratic dialogues we can see that virtue, as a core of morality, is considered behavioral or activity dominants, that is, it stipulates not only right to choose, but it also determines the choice itself, and its consequences. Around this time, the thesis that man pushes the boundaries of his freedom until it reaches the boundaries of the freedom of others, was formed.

While Socrates illustrated freedom as something positive in his teachings, in the teachings of his disciple Plato, we can see a major diversion from this trend. Plato interpreted freedom as something which incorporates all the *eidōs* (ideas) of his "Ideal State". Only in the absence of such social upheavals of society and in the legalized model of grouping citizens does freedom provide a framework for action within strict guidelines. In this context, "for state, excessive freedom becomes excessive dependence" [4]. However, Plato admits the need for obedience in

state laws. It presupposes the individual responsibility and choice options. According to Plato “the state without rule of law, or one which is under the despotic reign of somebody is much closer to its demise. Where there is law, she is the lord of the ruler, and he is her vassal, I am considering all the possibilities of the salvation of the state” [1]. In this context, only law can be seen as “the only authentic embodiment of freedom” [3]. Therefore, it is natural to ask whether the individual needs freedom, or whether is there correlation between the need of obedience to the laws and of superiority of state interests and the notion of freedom. While accepting the dominance of generality in the relationships of peculiarity, Plato concludes that obedience to the laws and loyalty to the traditions excludes the need for freedom, it disturbs the state interests, leads to civil disobedience and riots. The *eidos* (ideas) of freedom - is of state, not of the individual, and embodiment of the ideal model of state governance, not of individual.

Aristotle has different views on the problem of freedom. If Plato relates his view with the state and society, Aristotle relates it with disobedience. He also states that it has certain requirements.

In the philosophy of Aristotle man is interpreted as an active creature, which has a unique quality - the free choice. Particularly, activity, because of its “origin in personal effect”, or as scholastics put it, *sua sponte* origin, animated free [6].

Along with the interpretation of freedom in the form of a characteristic of activity, Aristotle considers it in connection with the concepts of arbitrariness and goodness. All kinds of activity are divided into the disobedient and purposeful. The first is associated with the obedience to the set rules, norms, natural or social orders, or obedience without knowing the exact consequences of the obedience.

Cognition and reason are the necessary conditions for independent activity. They are consciously actualized. In human reality, the freedom of choice, which determines the purpose and means of action and deeds with the help of reason and knowledge, thus arises. Arbitrary activities, in this view, require a certain freedom and understanding.

In Aristotle’s philosophy we can observe some aspects of rationality in the definition of the concept of freedom. However, representatives of the current of Neoplatonism, which emerged at the end of antiquity, apply this concept to divinity. This is especially evident in the work of Plotinus, the founder of Neo-Platonism. Freedom is manifested in the form of emanation.

In the philosophical system of Plotinus, we have: 1. Unity; 2. Eidos such as mind and "intellect"; 3. The Heart (Iposthesis) and the freedom of all souls in general. Even the hearts of unconscious animals and plants can be called “free” by Plotinus, albeit to a very unknown degree. Because, although their "activity" is considered to be very "vague thinking," they retain a part of the free thinking of the Mind. It is important to note that for Plotinus, everything in the emotional world - earth, fire, etc. - came to life, and as a result, some freedom is inherent in everything. Only the emotional matter was deprived of activity, completely deprived of freedom [5].

Besides, Iamblichus, Porphyry and Proclus provided unique perspectives to the problem of freedom, although they all agreed with Plotinus’ view on the matter. Iamblichus sees freedom in the interrelationship of the soul and unity. It is realized in a unique triple system. Porphyry attempts to solve the problem of freedom through practical mystics. The activities of Proclus marks the end of the School of Neo-Platonism. Proclus sees freedom in the synchronous existence of the body and soul.

There has been much debate among the philosophers of the antiquity on this matter. Neither did we at the beginning of 21st century find satisfying answers to the problems of freedom. And we assume, that our actions and attempts to find solution to this problem will always fall short of solving it, and this problem will become one of the things that we pass on to the next generation as we have received it.

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